Civil Liability for Wartime Environmental Damage: Adapting the United Nations Compensation for the Iraq War by McManus, Keith P
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 2 Article 6
1-1-2006
Civil Liability for Wartime Environmental Damage:
Adapting the United Nations Compensation for
the Iraq War
Keith P. McManus
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War
and Peace Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keith P. McManus, Civil Liability for Wartime Environmental Damage: Adapting the United Nations
Compensation for the Iraq War , 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 417 (2006),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol33/iss2/6
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR WARTIME 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE: ADAPTING 
THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION 
COMMISSION FOR THE IRAQ WAR 
Keith P. McManus*
Abstract: There is little doubt that war has a deleterious effect on the 
natural environment of battlegrounds. Customary principles of interna-
tional law, as well as more formal instruments such as treaties, address 
wartime environmental protection. An analysis of these mechanisms re-
veals that they are inadequate to ensure protection and restoration of 
environmental resources damaged during war. Thus, a mechanism is 
needed for assessing civil liability against nations for any wartime envi-
ronmental damage. The United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC), created to compensate victims of the Persian Gulf War, is a 
mechanism that if modiªed could ªll this void. This Note focuses on the 
modiªcations that could make the UNCC a successful mechanism for 
assessing civil liability for wartime environmental damage. Further, this 
Note applies the adapted UNCC to the Iraq War, and examines whether 
U.S.-led coalition forces should be held civilly liable for damage to 
Iraq’s natural environment. 
Introduction 
 The effects of war extend well beyond the destruction of strategic 
targets; civilian casualties are a devastating byproduct of inaccurate 
weaponry and military intelligence. Beyond human casualties, however, 
war also has a signiªcant detrimental effect upon a nation’s natural en-
vironment. What international law provisions exist to protect the envi-
ronment from wartime degradation? Can a nation be held civilly re-
sponsible when potentially irreplaceable environmental resources are 
damaged or destroyed during combat? This Note will address these 
questions, viewing the latter through the lens of the Iraq War, also 
known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, that commenced in March 2003. 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2005–06. 
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 Part I of this Note will examine historical impacts of warfare on 
the natural environment, including the current Iraq War. Part II will 
focus on the customary principles of international law governing war. 
Part III will address the current international environmental law pro-
visions concerning war and environmental degradation. Part IV will 
examine the possible civil liability schemes for environmental damage 
incurred during war. Part V will focus on adapting the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (UNCC) to create a framework for civil 
compensation for environmental damage caused by war that can be 
applied to modern conºicts, particularly the Iraq War. Finally, Part VI 
will apply the adapted UNCC framework to the Iraq War as a method 
of holding U.S.-led coalition (Coalition) forces civilly liable for envi-
ronmental degradation caused during the war. 
 This Note is not intended to offer a critique of the motives or ne-
cessity of the Iraq War, but rather addresses state responsibility for ac-
tions during war that damage a nation’s valuable natural environment. 
I. The Impact of War on the Environment 
A. Historical Overview of the Impact of War on the Environment 
 The effects of war on the environment—whether as an uninten-
tional byproduct of conventional warfare or a deliberate act to gain 
strategic advantage—are both catastrophic and well-catalogued.1 In 
146 B.C., the Romans salted the ªelds of Carthage to make the land 
useless for agricultural production.2 The United States’ use of atomic 
bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of 
World War II produced widespread environmental devastation,3 and 
exposed the environment to high levels of radiation.4 In the Vietnam 
War, the United States employed substances such as Agent Orange, 
which resulted in deforestation and destruction of vegetation.5
                                                                                                                      
1 Laurent R. Hourcle, Environmental Law of War, 25 Vt. L. Rev. 653, 654–58 (2001) 
(cataloguing the historical impacts of war on the environment). 
2 See id. at 654; Jessica Adley & Andrea Grant, The Environmental Consequences of War, 
The Sierra Club of Canada, Aug. 19, 2003, http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/post- 
ings/war-and-environment.html. The Romans’ actions were part of the Third Punic War. 
Hourcle, supra note 1, at 654. 
3 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 657. 
4 John Alan Cohan, Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental Protection 
Under the International Law of War, 15 Fla. J. Int’l L. 481, 487 (2003). 
5 See id. 
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 The growth of the environmental movement in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s expanded public consciousness of the environmental 
effects of certain warfare techniques.6 Despite this new awareness, 
however, war has continued to have disastrous effects on the natural 
environment. 
B. The Current Situation: The Persian Gulf War and Beyond 
 In 1991, Iraq, under the control of Saddam Hussein, invaded 
neighboring Kuwait, beginning the Persian Gulf War and a series of 
environmental catastrophes.7 Iraq pumped up to 4 million barrels of 
oil into the Persian Gulf, endangering marine wildlife, migratory 
birds, and the ªshing industry.8 In addition, Iraq set hundreds of Ku-
waiti oil wells ablaze, spewing carcinogenic smoke that lowered tem-
peratures and resulted in “black rain.”9 The total impact of Iraq’s mili-
tary action on the natural environment is difªcult to estimate.10 So 
far, twelve nations have submitted claims to the United Nations 
(U.N.), estimating the cost of environmental damage from the Per-
sian Gulf War at $79 billion.11
 More recently, U.S.-led air strikes in the former Yugoslavia re-
sulted in environmental damage.12 Operation Allied Force, under the 
aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), caused envi-
ronmental degradation through the bombing of industrial fuel and 
chemical plants.13 In one instance, air strikes resulted in the release of 
“2,100 metric tons of ethylene dichloride . . . and 200 kilograms of 
                                                                                                                      
6 See id. at 488. 
7 See Shilpi Gupta, Note, Iraq’s Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 Geo. Int’l 
Envtl. L. Rev. 251, 252 (1993). 
8 Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, The Gulf War, N.Y. L.J., July 26, 1991, at 3; see 
Gupta, supra note 7, at 252. 
9 Kass & Gerrard, supra note 8, at 3; see Hourcle, supra note 1, at 657; Gupta, supra note 
7, at 253. 
10 William A. Wilcox, Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. Ill. U. L.J. 299, 300 
(1993). “[T]he total impact of Iraqi environmental treachery may not be known for years 
. . . . The cumulative impact of the oil spills severely damaged Saudi Arabian shrimp beds 
and inºicted heavy damage on sea birds, turtles, and coral reefs.” Id. (citing Thomas P. 
Lippman, Gulf War Leaves Environment Severely Wounded, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 1991, at A1). 
11 Eric Pianin, Environmental Damages a Concern; Experts Fear Effects of War on Persian Gulf 
Region Could Be “Irreversible”, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 2003, at A21. 
12 Nicholas G. Alexander, Note, Airstrikes and Environmental Damage: Can the United 
States Be Held Liable for Operation Allied Force?, 11 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 471, 471 
(2000). 
13 Id. 
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metallic mercury” which polluted soil, a canal, and the Danube 
River.14
 More current and relevant to this analysis is the Iraq War, com-
menced by forces in March 2003.15 There is concern that the Iraq War 
will have a signiªcant effect on Iraq’s environment and water and 
could result in destruction of endangered species.16 Furthermore, the 
use of weapons that contain uranium by U.S. forces could result in 
widespread environmental contamination.17 At the beginning of the 
Iraq War, a group of two hundred lawyers and scholars from ªfty-one 
nations sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Koª Annan, warning 
of the possibility of “massive . . . environmental destruction.”18 For-
mer U.N. Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix said of the impending 
Iraq War: “To me the question of the environment is more ominous 
than that of peace and war.”19
 Another concern with the Iraq War from an environmental de-
struction standpoint is the protection of archaeological and culturally 
signiªcant artifacts, which are often included in a broad deªnition of 
“the environment.”20 Reports have indicated that the Iraq War has 
caused damage to some of Iraq’s most ancient artifacts, including the 
Ishtar Gate, which sustained damage when U.S.-led troops were based 
in the historic city of Babylon.21
 In March 2003, the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) is-
sued the Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq.22 The stated purpose of 
the Desk Study was to aid in “tackling the immediate post-conºict hu-
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. at 472. 
15 David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush Orders 
Start of War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 2003, at A1. In 
addition to the Iraq War, U.S. forces also bombed Afghanistan in 2001 as part of Operation 
Enduring Freedom. See Cohan, supra note 4, at 490. The campaign in Afghanistan has 
resulted in deforestation as well as signiªcant harm to wildlife. Id. 
16 Pianin, supra note 11. 
17 See Charles Seabrook, War in the Gulf: On the Front Lines: The Iraqi Environment; An-
other Casualty of War, Atlanta J.-Const., Apr. 9, 2003, at 16A. 
18 Experts Warn of Environmental Catastrophe, International Law Violations in Iraq War, U.S. 
Newswire, Mar. 18, 2003, http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=14009. 
19 Pianin, supra note 11. 
20 See Cohan, supra note 4, at 485. 
21 Sue Leeman, U.S.-Led Troops Inºicting Widespread Damage on Babylon, Museum Warns, 
Associated Press, Jan. 15, 2005, available at 1/16/05 APWORLD 00:18:46 (Westlaw). In 
addition, this account reported that armored vehicles destroyed “2,600-year-old brick 
pave[ment] . . . . [The damage] includ[ed] broken bricks stamped by King Nebuchadnez-
zar II . . . .” Id. 
22 United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Desk Study on the Envi-
ronment in Iraq (2003), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/iraq_ds_lowres.pdf. 
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manitarian situation in Iraq.”23 Among the “environmental impacts 
and risks” of the Iraq War discussed in the Desk Study were, inter alia, 
disruption of power and water supplies, waste management and dis-
ease, burning oil wells, bomb damage, damage to industrial sites, and 
physical degradation of ecosystems.24 In addition, the Desk Study indi-
cates that as of April 15, 2003, the U.S.-led “coalition air forces had 
used 18,275 precision-guided munitions . . . and around 8,975 un-
guided munitions.”25 The eight hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles 
used in the Iraq War as of April 12, 2003 were more than twice the 
amount used throughout the duration of the Persian Gulf War.26
II. The Customary Law of War and Its Relationship to 
Wartime Environmental Degradation 
 As shown by the examples listed above, the environment is at risk 
during wartime.27 But what international law mechanisms exist to 
govern the conduct of nations during wartime? How can these 
mechanisms be applied to determine whether or not the military ac-
tions of a nation that result in environmental destruction are lawful? 
A. Customary Principles of the Law of War 
 The law of war provides four customary principles that can be 
applied to an environmental analysis: necessity, proportionality, dis-
crimination, and humanity.28 These general principles are drawn 
from the Hague Convention, signed in 1907.29
 Under the customary principle of necessity, a nation may use any 
amount of force necessary to defeat the enemy, so long as those tech-
niques are legal under the laws of war.30 One commentator summa-
rizes this principle as “each destructive act must be connected to the 
submission of the enemy.”31 This principle would seem to afford na-
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. at 8. 
24 Id. at 70–83. 
25 Id. at 71. 
26 See id. 
27 See discussion infra Part I. 
28 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 662. 
29 Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]; Hourcle, supra note 1, at 662. 
30 Wilcox, supra note 10, at 302. 
31 Id. (citing Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage 
During Armed Conºict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1992)). 
 
422 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:417 
tions a wide degree of discretion for choice of military action, as one 
could argue that destruction of the natural environment is necessary 
for the defeat of the enemy.32 This principle, however, must be bal-
anced against the remaining three customary principles.33
 The customary principle of proportionality serves to mitigate the 
principle of necessity by requiring that military actions or weaponry 
not cause excessive destruction or loss of life when compared to the 
military advantage sought by the action.34 The principle of propor-
tionality is perhaps the most effective principle to apply to an envi-
ronmental analysis. For example, it is obvious that the Roman’s salting 
of ªelds and the Iraqi’s intentionally causing an oil spill would be ille-
gal because the destruction caused by the acts is excessive when com-
pared to the pursued military advantage.35
 The customary principle of discrimination holds that militaries 
must distinguish between military and civilian targets, and use appro-
priate weapons that are capable of this type of discrimination.36 Un-
der this principle, it is illegal to attack nonmilitary targets, such as en-
vironmental resources like forests and bodies of water.37
 The humanity principle is embodied in the notion that “[m]ilitary 
forces at war must . . . take all possible measures to avoid unnecessary 
suffering.”38 Much of the environmental degradation that results from 
warfare, such as the use of biological weapons or contamination of the 
natural environment creates unnecessary human suffering.39 Histori-
cally, the humanity principle only applied to human suffering, and 
therefore, those environmental harms that affected human suffering.40 
Following Iraq’s actions in the Persian Gulf War, some have suggested 
                                                                                                                      
Wilcox also points out that this “principle was articulated in writing as early as 1868 in the 
Declaration of St. Petersburg.” Id. at 303. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 667–68. Hourcle points out that Article 51 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention codiªes the principle of proportionality: “‘[A]n at-
tack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, dam-
age to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.’” Id. (quoting Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conºicts art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [here-
inafter Protocol I]). 
35 See Wilcox, supra note 10, at 303. 
36 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 665–66. 
37 See id. at 666. 
38 Wilcox, supra note 10, at 303. 
39 See Cohan, supra note 4, at 495–96. 
40 See id. at 496. 
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that the international community has shifted to a wider view of unnec-
essary suffering in applying the humanity principle.41
 These general customary principles of the law of war were not de-
veloped to protect the environment during wartime; however, the 
breadth of the principles can be applied to evaluate the actions of a 
nation to determine whether or not a military action that results in en-
vironmental degradation is lawful under the international law of war.42
B. The 1907 Hague Convention 
 In addition to the customary principles of the law of war, ofªcial 
treaties that codify general laws of war can be applied to the area of 
wartime environmental protection.43 First among these treaties is the 
Hague Convention of 1907, which is an early example of a binding 
law of war.44 The provision of the Hague Convention that seems most 
applicable to environmental protection is Article 23(g), which states 
that it is unlawful “[t]o destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless 
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessi-
ties of war.”45 There are many legal traditions, including the public 
trust doctrine,46 and old English cases like Keeble v. Hickeringill, that 
consider natural resources to be property.47 Under this viewpoint, Ar-
ticle 23(g) would stand as a strong, binding international law prohib-
iting the destruction of the environment during war unless impera-
tively necessary.48
 However, it is this very clause that makes Article 23(g) somewhat 
problematic in affording protection against environmental destruc-
tion.49 The clause requires that military conduct be balanced against 
the principle of necessity, which could trump environmental concerns 
in many instances.50
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. 
42 See Wilcox, supra note 10, at 304. 
43 See id.; Alexander, supra note 12, at 475–76. 
44 Alexander, supra note 12, at 476. 
45 Hague Convention, supra note 29, art. 23(g); see Wilcox, supra note 10, at 304–05. 
46 For a general discussion of the public trust doctrine’s history and modern applica-
tion, see Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Note, Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory and Physi-
cal Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 421 (2005). 
47 See, e.g., (1707) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B.). 
48 Sharp, supra note 31, at 11; see Wilcox, supra note 10, at 304. 
49 See Stephanie N. Simonds, Note, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A 
Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 Stan. J. Int’l L. 165, 171 (1992). 
50 See id. 
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C. The Geneva Convention of 1949 
 The Geneva Convention of 194951 is very similar to the 1907 
Hague Convention in scope and application to environmental protec-
tion.52 Like the Hague Convention, Article 53 of the Geneva Conven-
tion forbids an occupying force from destroying any type of property, 
except when “absolutely necessary.”53 In terms of environmental pro-
tection, the Geneva Convention has the same limitation as the Hague 
Convention, in that there is a built-in recognition of military neces-
sity.54 The Geneva Convention is even less useful for environmental 
protection because its stated purpose is “to protect a strictly deªned 
category of civilians from arbitrary action on the part of the enemy,” 
which tends to limit the expansion of Article 53.55
III. International Environmental Law and War 
A. International Instruments Respecting War and the Environment 
 The customary principles of the law of war and the two binding 
conventions discussed above are important because they represent the 
basic underpinnings of the law of war.56 However, these principles are 
limited in application to environmental protection during wartime 
because they were not drafted with the intention of being applied to 
the environment.57 In 1977, this all changed with the introduction of 
the word “environment” into the international law of war.58
1. Protocol I to the Geneva Convention 
 Protocol I to the Geneva Convention59 was the ªrst formal inter-
national law of war document to use the word “environment.”60 Al-
though Protocol I has not been ratiªed by the United States, its provi-
sions concerning the environment “have been ofªcially cited by the 
                                                                                                                      
51 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. 
52 See Simonds, supra note 49, at 171–72. 
53 Geneva Convention, supra note 51, art. 53; Simonds, supra note 49, at 171–72. 
54 See Geneva Convention, supra note 51, art. 53. 
55 Simonds, supra note 49, at 172 (quoting Commentary on the IV Geneva Conven-
tion 301–02 ( Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)). 
56 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 660–61. 
57 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 478. 
58 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 670. 
59 Protocol I, supra note 34. 
60 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 670. 
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United States.”61 The relevant portions of the document speciªcally 
address wartime environmental degradation and the associated weap-
onry.62 The three relevant sections of Protocol I are Articles 35(3), 55, 
and 56.63
 Article 35(3) states that “[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or 
means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment.”64
 Article 55, entitled “Protection of the Natural Environment,” 
states that “[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural en-
vironment against widespread, long-term and severe damage” and 
“includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare 
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the 
natural environment . . . .”65
 Article 56, though not aimed speciªcally at environmental pro-
tection, could help to avoid signiªcant environmental damage.66 Arti-
cle 56 seeks to protect public works and installations that could have 
disastrous environmental results if destroyed, “namely dams, dykes and 
nuclear electrical generating stations.”67 Article 56, however, is limited 
because it does not include industrial facilities, and therefore, does 
not prohibit the kind of environmental destruction that occurred 
during Operation Allied Force in the former Yugoslavia.68
 Although the use of the term “natural environment” is a promis-
ing and noteworthy development in the body of the law of war,69 
other phrases in these articles of Protocol I have proven trouble-
some.70 Both Articles 35(3) and 55 only prohibit damage to the natu-
ral environment that is “widespread, long-term and severe.”71 The 
Department of Defense has stated that “[d]uring . . . negotiation [of 
Protocol I], there was general agreement that one of its criteria for de-
termining whether a violation had taken place (“long term”) was 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 672. 
62 Andy Rich, The Environment: Adequacy of Protection in Times of War, 12 Penn St. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 445, 451 (2004). 
63 See Protocol I, supra note 34, arts. 35, 55, 56; Hourcle, supra note 1, at 672–73. 
64 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 35. 
65 Id. at art. 55. 
66 See Rich, supra note 62, at 452. 
67 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 56. 
68 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 658, 674. 
69 See Simonds, supra note 49, at 173. 
70 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 673. 
71 Protocol I, supra note 34, at 28; see Hourcle, supra note 1, at 673. 
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measured in decades.”72 Based on this deªnition of “long-term” the 
Department concluded that it was unclear whether the environmental 
damages caused by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War “would meet the 
technical-legal use of that term in Protocol I.”73 The Defense Depart-
ment’s interpretation is in spite of the fact that the damage was “se-
vere in a layman’s sense of the term.”74
 Another phrase of concern is “intended or may be expected” in 
Article 55.75 The inclusion of these terms means that there is no pro-
hibition on collateral environmental damage when it is not intended 
or expected—the most likely kind of damage to occur during war.76 
This narrow reading on the prohibition of environmental damage in 
Protocol I is supported by a Department of Defense report which 
states that “[t]he prohibitions on damage to the environment con-
tained in Protocol I were not intended to prohibit battleªeld damage 
caused by conventional operations . . . .”77
 Protocol I to the Geneva Convention represents an important 
development for the recognition of the need for environmental pro-
tection during war, but it is greatly limited in its application and 
“lack[s] strength due to vague and uncertain wording.”78
2. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modiªcation Techniques 
 Another international law mechanism that makes explicit refer-
ence to environmental protection during war is the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modiªcation Techniques (ENMOD).79 The purpose of ENMOD— 
which was drafted in response to the use of deforestation chemicals by 
the United States in Vietnam80—is to prohibit environmental 
                                                                                                                      
72 Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf 
War-Appendix on the Role of the Law of War [hereinafter DOD Report], reprinted in 31 
I.L.M. 612, 636–37 (1992). 
73 Id. at 637. 
74 Id. 
75 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 55; see Hourcle, supra note 1, at 673. 
76 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 673. 
77 DOD Report, supra note 72, at 637. 
78 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 674. 
79 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modiªcation Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [herein-
after ENMOD]. 
80 Cohan, supra note 4, at 511. 
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modiªcation for hostile purposes.81 The signiªcance of ENMOD is ap-
parent when compared to the wording of Protocol I.82 Article I of EN-
MOD prohibits any party to the treaty from “hostile use of environ-
mental modiªcation techniques having widespread, long-lasting or 
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury . . . .”83
 While ENMOD contains the same adjectives—”widespread,” “long-
lasting,” (“long-term” in Protocol I) and “severe”—as Protocol I, EN-
MOD uses “or” instead of “and” in connecting these terms.84 This cre-
ates a more stringent prohibition, since any environmental 
modiªcation that results in widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects 
would be prohibited, as opposed to Protocol I, which requires that all 
three criteria be met.85 Also of importance is the fact that ENMOD 
does not provide an exception for military necessity.86
 Despite these important differences between ENMOD and Proto-
col I, critics suggest that ENMOD is not likely to curtail environmental 
degradation caused by war.87 One major criticism is that ENMOD is 
limited by the fact that it prohibits environmental modiªcation tech-
niques only, and does not forbid conventional warfare tactics that dam-
age the environment as a byproduct.88 Critics have suggested that EN-
MOD, therefore, prohibits “the kinds of methods used by villains in 
science ªction rather than conventional warfare,”89 since the environ-
mental modiªcation must be a “deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes— the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth . . . .”90
 Therefore, ENMOD’s signiªcance is rooted in the fact that it is 
the ªrst international treaty to come into existence for the sole pur-
pose of environmental protection during war, rather than for its prac-
tical effect on the wartime conduct of nations.91
                                                                                                                      
81 ENMOD, supra note 79, art. 1. 
82 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 675–76; Rich, supra note 62, at 453. 
83 ENMOD, supra note 79, art. 1. 
84Protocol I, supra note 34, arts. 35, 55; ENMOD, supra note 79, art. 1; see Hourcle, su-
pra note 1, at 675–76; Rich, supra note 62, at 453. 
85 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 675–76. 
86 Rich, supra note 62, at 452–53. 
87 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 675–76; Rich, supra note 62, at 453. 
88 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 675. 
89 Id. 
90 ENMOD, supra note 79, art. 2. 
91 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 675; Rich, supra note 62, at 453. 
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3. Rio Declaration 
 Another international document that addresses environmental 
degradation that results from war is the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development of 1992.92 The Rio Declaration was a followup 
to the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment of 1972,93 
which was the ªrst U.N. Conference that dealt solely with the envi-
ronment.94 Unlike Protocol I and ENMOD, the Rio Declaration is a 
nonbinding document.95 Nevertheless, it was negotiated and agreed 
to by 176 nations, and represents an “important example of the use of 
soft law instruments in the process of codiªcation and development 
of international law.”96
 Most applicable to the issue of war and the environment are 
Principles 23 and 24 of the Rio Declaration.97 Principle 23 states, 
“[t]he environment and natural resources of people under oppres-
sion, domination and occupation shall be protected.”98 Principle 24 
states, “[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. 
States shall therefore respect international law providing protection 
for the environment in times of armed conºict and cooperate in its 
further development, as necessary.”99
 Although these principles are nonbinding, some commentators 
consider them to be valuable instruments.100 Most noteworthy about 
Principle 23 is that it establishes “an absolute right to environmental 
protection and not one balanced by the needs of the belligerent par-
ties.”101 In this way, it sidesteps the pitfall of military necessity that so 
dominates customary principles of the law of war and the early trea-
ties.102 Furthermore, Principle 23 recognizes oppression and domina-
                                                                                                                      
92 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 
( June 14, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 814, available at http:// 
www.unep.org/Documents/Default.Print.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163. 
93 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 June 16, 1972 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], reprinted 
in 11 I.L.M. 1416, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp? 
DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503. 
94 Patricia W. Birnie & Alan Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and 
the Environment 1 (1995). 
95 See id. at 9. 
96 Id. 
97 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 677–78; Rich, supra note 62, at 454. 
98 Rio Declaration, supra note 92, princ. 23. 
99 Id. princ. 24. 
100 See Birnie & Boyle, supra note 94, at 9; Hourcle, supra note 1, at 678. 
101 Hourcle, supra note 1, at 678. 
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tion—likely the predominant nature of hostilities in the modern 
age.103 Principle 24 is signiªcant because it recognizes the need to 
further develop international wartime environmental protection law, 
although it does not give any speciªc guidance.104
4. Red Cross Guidelines 
 Another nonbinding international wartime environmental pro-
tection document that could be useful in determining breaches of 
international law is published by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross.105 Entitled Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on 
the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conºict, the publica-
tion states that wartime environmental degradation which is not nec-
essary is a breach of international humanitarian law and is punishable 
as such.106 The Guidelines list a series of prohibited acts within envi-
ronmental degradation, including deforestation, and destruction of 
civilian objects or historic monuments.107 The Guidelines are a compi-
lation of existing international environmental laws.108 This is notewor-
thy because the Guidelines “translate often vague international norms 
into daily practice.”109 As a result, the bulk of international environ-
mental protection law should be incorporated into the military opera-
tions manuals of all nations, raising the possibility that environmental 
war crimes could be successfully enforced at law.110
                                                                                                                      
103 Rich, supra note 62, at 454. 
104 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 678. 
105 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the 
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230–37 (1996) [hereinafter ICRC Guidelines], available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/ 
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107 ICRC Guidelines, supra note 105, art. III. 
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tive knowledge imputed to all military and civilian leaders and agents for purposes of cul-
pability under international criminal legislation.” Id. 
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5. Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
 In 1996, the International Law Commission adopted Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility.111 The purpose of the Draft Articles is to 
codify rules on state responsibility for wrongful acts, beginning with 
the principle that “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails 
the international responsibility of that State.”112 Most applicable to an 
environmental analysis is Article 19(3)(d) of the Draft Articles that 
states “an international crime may result . . . from . . . a serious breach 
of an international obligation of essential importance for the safe-
guarding and preservation of the human environment.”113 The im-
portance of this provision is rooted in the fact that it “is one of the few 
international agreements . . . that demonstrated a willingness to 
criminalize environmental degradation.”114
B. Possible Criminal Enforcement Mechanisms for War-Related 
Environmental Damage 
 As evidenced from the discussion of international law, enforce-
ment is a difªcult proposition, especially given the limited number of 
courts that would hear “environmental war crimes” cases.115 For ex-
ample, despite the well-documented environmental harm committed 
by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, no international tribunal took any 
steps to prosecute the acts as environmental war crimes.116
1. International Court of Justice 
 One possible enforcement mechanism is the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), established as the judicial body of the U.N. through its 
charter.117 Under Article 93 of the U.N. Charter, all members of the 
U.N. are automatically parties to the Court.118 Although the ICJ is 
equipped to hear environmental war crimes cases, it is unlikely that it 
                                                                                                                      
111 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
(1996) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles], available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/ 
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114 Drumbl, supra note 105, at 139–40. 
115 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 687. 
116 Id. 
117 U.N. Charter art. 92, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. 
118 Id. art. 93, para. 1. 
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ever will.119 Under the rules that govern the ICJ, no claims can be 
heard or adjudicated unless the nation against which the claim is being 
brought consents to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.120 Therefore, the ICJ is 
not an effective mechanism for enforcing environmental war crimes 
because it is unlikely that any nation would consent to jurisdiction.121
2. International Criminal Court 
 Another possible enforcement mechanism for liability for war-
time environmental degradation is the newly formed International 
Criminal Court (ICC).122 Organized pursuant to the Rome Statute, 
the ICC is the ªrst international criminal tribunal.123 Though not or-
ganized with the intention of prosecuting environmental crimes, the 
Rome Statute includes a reference to environmental degradation in 
its list of justiciable offenses.124 Speciªcally, Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute includes “[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowl-
edge that such attack will cause incidental . . . widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment” among its catalog of 
“war crimes.”125
 Similar to the ICJ, it is unlikely that the ICC will be an effective 
tribunal for prosecuting environmental crimes.126 Despite the inclu-
sion of environmental damage in the list of war crimes, the Rome 
Statute has “either a high threshold for the crime or incorporates a 
military necessity balancing test.”127 Therefore, it is unlikely that envi-
ronmental damage caused by conventional warfare would be punish-
able, although some of Iraq’s actions in the Persian Gulf War may fall 
within the ambit of the Rome Statute.128 The unlikelihood of the ICC 
                                                                                                                      
119 See Hourcle, supra note 1, at 687–89; Alexander, supra note 12, at 485. 
120 International Court of Justice, Rules of Court art. 38(5) (1978, amended 2005) 
[hereinafter ICJ Rules], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasic 
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Court, 18 Va. Envtl. L.J. 217, 218–19 (1999). 
123 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 ( July 
17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/ 
english/rome_statute(e).pdf; see Sharp, supra note 122, at 217–18. 
124 Rome Statute, supra note 123, art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Drumbl, supra note 105, at 124. 
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as an enforcement mechanism for wartime environmental damage 
“runs counter to the thinking that international humanitarian law 
may offer the possibility of an effective response to wartime environ-
mental destruction.”129
 The ICC is also hampered by the fact that not all nations are, or 
will likely ever be, parties to the Court—including the United States— 
for failing to ratify the Rome Statute.130
IV. Civil Liability for Wartime Environmental Degradation: 
Possible Enforcement Mechanisms 
 The current customary law and treaty system is inadequate for 
protection of the environment from damage caused by conventional 
warfare.131 Civil liability, which has been utilized in past conºicts, may 
be a more appropriate remedy and could serve as a possible deterrent 
to methods of warfare that cause environmental damage.132 This Part 
will look at various civil liability systems by comparing possibilities and 
limitations for recouping environmental damage caused by war. 
A. United Nations Security Council Enforcement 
 In response to Iraq’s actions in the invasion of Kuwait during the 
Persian Gulf War, the U.N. passed Resolution 687, cataloguing Iraq’s 
actions and detailing reparations.133 Paragraph 16 of Resolution 687 
states “Iraq . . . is liable under international law for any direct loss, 
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natu-
ral resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corpo-
rations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Ku-
wait.”134 As a member of the U.N., Security Council resolutions are 
binding upon Iraq.135 Thus, it would seem that Security Council en-
forcement is an effective way to enforce civil liability for environ-
mental damage inºicted during war, since such damage was explicitly 
                                                                                                                      
129 Drumbl, supra note 105, at 124. 
130 A full list of nations that have ratiªed the Rome Statute can be found at the ICC 
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included in Resolution 687.136 The Security Council, however, has had 
problems with enforcing resolutions; therefore, the U.N. created the 
UNCC through Resolution 687.137
B. United Nations Compensation Commission 
 Paragraph 18 of Resolution 687 “create[s] a fund to pay compen-
sation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 . . . and . . . establish[es] 
a Commission that will administer the fund.”138 The UNCC is not a 
court, but rather is an administrative body that processes claims and 
determines proper amounts of payment from the fund.139 Setting up 
and funding the UNCC turned out to be two very different projects, 
as a lack of cooperation by Iraq turned a projected $6 billion com-
pensation fund into a mere $21 million by 1993.140 However, this was 
sufªcient to compensate all those who ªled valid personal injury 
claims.141 The UNCC set up a series of categories based on the differ-
ent types of losses that were suffered by individuals.142 Those who suf-
fered injury due to Iraq’s actions could then submit claims within the 
categories and receive compensation from the UNCC.143
 The UNCC represents a novel and potentially powerful tool for 
civil liability, because unlike the ICJ or ICC, the UNCC can operate 
without consent from the sanctioned party.144 As such, the UNCC as it 
exists could be adapted to future conºicts to recoup the cost of envi-
ronmental damage, and also to create a deterrent to any environmen-
tally destructive action because of potential civil liability.145
 There has been extensive critical commentary in this area, dis-
cussing the strengths and weaknesses of the UNCC as a mechanism 
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for civil compensation for wartime environmental damage.146 The 
limitations of the UNCC involve the cooperation of the sanctioned 
nation, as well as the presence of public wealth that could be seized by 
the UNCC.147 Although the UNCC has jurisdiction without the con-
sent of the sanctioned party, that nation—like Iraq after the Persian 
Gulf War—could impede funding of the UNCC by failing to cooper-
ate with sanctions.148In addition, critics have cited the low priority 
status of environmental claims in the UNCC claims category hierarchy 
as another weakness.149 UNCC claims are divided into six categories, 
running A through F; claims for environmental damage are included 
in category F4, the “second from the bottom of all ‘F’ claims.”150
C. The Alien Tort Claims Act 
 The Alien Tort Claims Act151 (ATCA) is a U.S. federal law that 
grants the federal courts jurisdiction over tort claims ªled by aliens.152 
The full text of ATCA reads “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”153 Use 
of ATCA for ªling suit for environmental damage was shown in Beanal 
v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.154 In Beanal, an Indonesian citizen ªled suit 
against a U.S. corporation for environmental damage.155 Although 
the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, the existence of the case estab-
lishes the potential of ATCA and the federal courts as a means and 
venue to ªnd civil liability for environmental damage to other na-
tions.156
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 However, the potential adaptability of ATCA is limited when ap-
plied to environmental damage caused by war.157 Commentators have 
recognized that the “Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act . . . supersedes 
the ATCA when the defendant state was acting in its ofªcial capacity,” 
which is likely to be the case in any act of war.158 In addition, the 
United States cannot be a defendant under ATCA, limiting any possible 
recovery for environmental damage in the Iraq War.159 If a creative 
plaintiff sought to sidestep the government’s immunity by ªling suit 
against ofªcers of the United States, the case would likely fail as a non-
justiciable political question.160
V. Adapting the United Nations Compensation Commission:  
A Proposal for a Civil Compensation Scheme for  
Wartime Environmental Damage 
 Despite the numerous international law provisions that serve to 
protect the environment from degradation during war,161 there exists 
a gap between the growing international concern for the environ-
ment and the mechanisms that can actually curtail environmental 
damage caused by war.162 The gap exists for practical reasons, such as 
the lack of clearly deªned violations and methods of enforcement.163 
In addition, there are political reasons, such as the reluctance of some 
nations to consent to jurisdiction of international courts.164 Some 
commentators also believe that there is a lack of adequate scientiªc 
information concerning the effects of war on the environment.165
 Closing this gap requires the development of a mechanism that 
clearly deªnes wartime environmental damage and has the ability to 
enforce its judgments—both to compensate those affected by war and 
to serve as a deterrent from future unnecessary environmental degra-
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dation.166 In developing such a mechanism, it is instructive to look at 
some of the successes of domestic environmental law. For example, 
the Clean Air Act,167 and Clean Water Act,168 have had “teeth,” and 
thus a degree of success, due to the statutes’ provisions for citizen par-
ticipation.169 The current international law and warfare mechanism 
that has the most citizen participation is the UNCC, since individuals 
and corporations were given the ability to make claims and be 
awarded damages.170 This is noteworthy as UNCC awards are distrib-
uted to individual claimants through their governments, rather than 
directly to governments to use as it chooses.171
 The major issue for any environmental protection that is only 
magniªed when dealing on an international level is enforcement.172 If 
citizens of an affected nation are going to successfully recover dam-
ages for environmental degradation from a foreign nation, they will 
need a body that has the authority to collect those damages. While the 
ICJ and the ICC are hamstrung by limited jurisdiction based on con-
sent and membership,173 the U.N. has a wide membership, and the 
support of the majority of the world’s nations.174 As discussed above, 
the U.N. has already established the UNCC for dealing with claims 
arising against Iraq from the Persian Gulf War.175 Given its widespread 
international support, “[t]he Commission is a concrete manifestation 
of the international community’s commitment to the principles of 
state responsibility.”176
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 The citizen participation aspect of the UNCC and its position as 
part of the U.N. make it particularly suited for adaptation to create a 
permanent body for imposing civil liability for environmental damage 
caused by war.177 In fact, in December 2004, the UNCC approved $2.9 
billion in awards based on claims of environmental damage resulting 
from the Persian Gulf War.178 Kuwait received $2.27 billion, Saudi Ara-
bia received $625 million, and Iran received a small amount.179 Inter-
estingly, Saudi Arabia’s award was compensation for environmental 
damage caused by the international coalition forces that liberated Ku-
wait, who used the Saudi desert for military installations.180 Further-
more, the explicit reference to “environmental damage and the deple-
tion of natural resources” as a cognizable claim in Resolution 687, 
which created the UNCC, is additional evidence of how the UNCC is 
suited for adaptation to ensure civil compensation for wartime envi-
ronmental harm.181
A. Structure of the United Nations Compensation Commission 
 In terms of structure, the “UNCC is a subsidiary branch of the 
[U.N.] Security Council . . . composed of the Governing Council, the 
Commissioners, and the Secretariat.182 The report of the U.N. Secre-
tary-General, which detailed the structure of the Commission stated: 
The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before 
which the parties appear; it is a political organ that performs 
an essentially fact-ªnding function of examining claims, veri-
fying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and 
resolving disputed claims. It is only in this last respect that a 
quasi-judicial function may be involved.183
 Thus, the Commission is an administrative, not judicial, body that 
serves to review and ªll claims.184 The Commissioners’ duty is to re-
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view submitted claims.185 The Secretariat administers the fund, while 
providing administrative support to the Governing Council.186
B. Weaknesses of the United Nations Compensation Commission 
 The UNCC’s ability to serve as a civil compensation scheme for 
wartime environmental damage is hampered by several issues.187 
From a practical standpoint, the UNCC is limited by the fact that the 
sanctioned nation must have public wealth that can be seized to add 
monies to the fund and any uncooperative nation can make the col-
lecting of such money difªcult.188 Another problem arising from a 
lack of money is the fact that the UNCC does not support itself and 
requires money from the sanctioned nation to cover its high adminis-
trative costs.189 These costs are the result of the need for support staff 
as well as the high cost of specialists to serve as commissioners.190 
These costs may well continue to be considerable, as commentators 
have estimated that it may take sixteen to thirty years to settle all 
claims.191 Despite this estimate the UNCC reports that claims process-
ing was concluded in June 2005, with only “payment of awards to 
claimants and a number of residual tasks” remaining.192
 Another weakness of the UNCC results from the timing of the 
ªling of claims, especially when concerning claims for environmental 
damage.193 All environmental damage claims had to be for harms that 
occurred between August 2, 1990 and March 2, 1991.194 In addition, 
environmental damage claims submitted to the UNCC had to be ªled 
by February 1, 1997.195 Given that the extent of environmental dam-
ages are often not known until long after the initial harm occurs, it is 
likely that many environmental damages will be under-compensated if 
compensated at all.196
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C. Strengths of the United Nations Compensation Commission as a Civil 
Compensation Mechanism for Wartime Environmental Damage 
 In addition to the beneªts discussed above, another strength of 
the UNCC as a model for a civil compensation mechanism for war-
time environmental damage is its broad deªnition of “environmental 
damage.”197 Decision 7 of the Governing Council of the UNCC details 
the type of environmental losses that can be submitted as claims.198 
Paragraph 35 of the document lists as compensable claims any 
“[a]batement and prevention of environmental damage . . . measures 
already taken to clean and restore the environment or future meas-
ures . . . monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage . . . 
monitoring of public health . . . and [d]epletion of or damage to 
natural resources.”199
 The broad deªnition of environmental damage utilized by the 
UNCC was informed by a report furnished by the U.N. Environment 
Programme (UNEP).200 The purpose of the UNEP report was to “pro-
vide[] . . . deªnitions and guidance for evaluating environmental 
claims.”201 Most useful to wartime environmental compensation is the 
fact that the UNEP report interpreted “‘environmental damage’” in a 
broad sense to mean “‘impairment of the environment.’”202 Accord-
ing to the UNEP report, the damage need not be permanent to be a 
compensable environmental harm.203 Also of note is the UNEP re-
port’s broad deªnition of “natural resources,” which the report inter-
preted as naturally occurring assets that “‘have a primarily commercial 
use or . . . value.’”204
 Another strength of the UNCC is its efªciency as a clearinghouse 
for civil compensation for wartime environmental damage. Although 
twelve years may seem like a long time to process claims, it is efªcient 
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when viewed in light of the fact that: (1) there were 2.68 million 
claims ªled; (2) the UNCC was operating with a unique mandate con-
sisting of new procedures; and (3) court proceedings on a single case 
can sometimes take nearly as long.205 This level of efªciency could 
never be achieved using a standard judicial process to adjudicate war-
time environmental damage claims. 
D. Adapting the United Nations Compensation Commission to Serve as a 
Civil Compensation Mechanism for Wartime Environmental Damage 
 Given the strengths and weaknesses detailed above, it is apparent 
that the UNCC is a unique international body that has the capacity for 
ªlling the gap between existing wartime environmental law and the 
need for an enforceable civil compensation scheme.206 However, be-
fore it can be utilized to redress environmental wrongs in future 
conºicts, it must be adapted to increase its effectiveness.207
 As a threshold issue, the U.N. Security Council must make the 
UNCC a permanent body with jurisdiction over future conºicts, as the 
UNCC has reached “completion of 12 years of claims processing . . . 
and brings to an end the work of the panels of Commissioners, as a 
whole.”208 Doing so will ensure, for the sake of efªciency, that this 
unique mechanism need not be reorganized and reconvened to han-
dle claims arising out of any future military conºicts. 
1. Increasing the Priority of Environmental Claims 
 If the UNCC is to be an effective civil compensation mechanism 
for wartime environmental damage, it is also going to have to increase 
the priority level of environmental damage claims.209 During the claims 
process, the UNCC expedited category A, B, and C claims, while the 
focus on category D, E, and F claims only occurred “in recent years.”210 
In an adapted version of the UNCC, environmental damage claims 
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must be given a higher priority to ensure timely and successful process-
ing of claims.211
2. Permanent Funding 
 Another important change that must be made in adapting the 
UNCC is to fund the Commission from outside sources, as opposed to 
the seized assets of the sanctioned nation.212 The UNCC, as it cur-
rently operates, relies upon Iraq’s oil sanctions for its existence.213 If 
the UNCC is to remain as a permanent, viable entity, it will have to be 
properly funded and not be at the mercy of potentially uncooperative 
sanctioned nations.214 Commentators have suggested voluntary con-
tributions, taxes, and permits as possible revenue streams to support 
the UNCC.215
3. Developing a Clear and Precise Deªnition of Environmental Damage 
a. Learning from Existing International Environmental Law of War 
 Most important to an adaptation of the UNCC that successfully 
compensates for wartime environmental damage is a clear and precise 
deªnition of what constitutes a compensable environmental harm.216 
The framework of Decision 7 and the technical assistance of the 
UNEP report offer a good starting point because they interpret envi-
ronmental damage very broadly, enhancing environmental protec-
tion.217 However, these existing UNCC deªnitions can be bolstered by 
incorporating the strengths and weaknesses of the existing environ-
mental law of war instruments and customs previously examined.218
 Early environmental law of war provisions, such as the Hague Con-
vention (1907) and the Geneva Convention (1949), are inadequate to 
protect the environment because they contain a military necessity ex-
ception derived from customary principles of war.219 In addition, Proto-
col I contains environmental provisions that are hampered by imprecise 
wording—for example, “long-term” harm—which can be interpreted to 
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make certain environmental damage noncompensable.220 Furthermore, 
Protocol I is hindered by not taking collateral damage into account and 
only prohibiting wartime environmental damage that is intended or ex-
pected to occur.221
 The shortcomings in the language of preexisting international 
environmental law of war provisions can be avoided by drafting clear 
and precise deªnitions of environmental harms.222 The deªnition 
must not contain any military necessity exceptions, in order to cut 
down on the ability of nations to use the customary law of war to avoid 
liability.223 The deªnitions should also follow the UNEP report in its 
broad interpretation of environmental damage, and not get trapped 
by the “widespread, long-term, and severe” language contained in 
Protocol I and ENMOD.224 Rather, the deªnition of environmental 
harm should allow for a wide variety of claimants and latitude for 
those who evaluate the claims. 
b. Geographic Limitations 
 There should be some limitation in the deªnition of compensable 
environmental harm, however, especially in the area of geographic 
limitation.225 The UNCC deªnitions, as applied to the Persian Gulf 
War, did not “set[] any limit on the geographical location of losses, a 
circumstance which could have given rise to difªcult issues of proof of 
causation and of evidence.”226 Any future deªnitions of compensable 
environmental damage should include reasonable geographical limita-
tions to ensure that sanctioned nations are not held responsible for un-
related environmental problems in remote regions, where there is a 
tenuous chain of causation.227
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4. The Timing of Claims 
 Another important change to make is the implementation of 
more liberal ªling deadlines for environmental claims.228 There 
should be a deadline so that the sanctioned nation need not fear the 
ªling of claims indeªnitely.229 However, this deadline should extend 
longer than the six years allowed under the current UNCC system.230 
Although the February 1, 1997 deadline for environmental claims is 
extended over a year beyond the deadlines for other categories of 
claims, this seems insufªcient.231 Wartime “environmental damage of 
such magnitude will most probably have long-term, widespread and at 
present not yet fully apparent negative effects.”232
5. Studying the Effectiveness of the Size of Environmental Awards 
 Another important factor that should be considered is whether 
the size of the environmental damage awards of the UNCC were ade-
quate to rehabilitate or compensate for environmental damage.233 A 
study comparing prewar and post-UNCC award Persian Gulf envi-
ronmental quality would be helpful in determining whether the envi-
ronmental damage awards from the UNCC were too small.234 If such a 
study were to ªnd that the environmental awards were insufªcient to 
rehabilitate the wartime environmental damage, then the size of the 
awards should be increased when the UNCC is made a permanent 
body. Appropriate award sizes will also lead to greater efªciency, as 
those satisªed with awards will be less likely to pursue compensation 
through national courts.235 Recovery through the UNCC does not 
preclude the use of traditional legal methods to pursue remedies, and 
“[t]he risk of ºooding national courts with lawsuits or other proceed-
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ings against Iraq is inversely proportional to the degree of ‘customer 
satisfaction’ provided by the UNCC.”236
VI. Should U.S.-Led Coalition Forces Be Held Civilly Liable 
for Environmental Damage in the Iraq War Under a  
Modiªed United Nations Compensation Commission 
Compensation Scheme? 
A. Legality of the 2003 Iraq War 
 There has been heated debate on both sides of the political spec-
trum about whether or not the U.S.-led coalition (Coalition) should 
have gone to war in Iraq, and this debate is still raging today.237 The 
purpose of this Note is not to comment on the moral, ethical, or po-
litical justiªcations for the Iraq War. As such, the following section will 
focus on the legality of the war and whether or not the Coalition238 
should be open to claims for environmental damage caused during 
the War. 
 U.N. Resolution 687 predicated Iraq’s liability on the fact that its 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, which started the Persian Gulf War, 
was “unlawful.”239 Therefore, the legality of the military conduct is a 
determining factor as to whether or not liability should be assessed.240
 The Iraq War was not predicated on self-defense, but rather on a 
doctrine of preemptive military action, unauthorized by the U.N. Se-
curity Council and, thus, “without the cloak of legality and legitimacy 
that clear Security Council authority would have provided.”241 Critics 
have argued that preemptive military action is a “dangerous doctrine 
. . . so patently lacking in any basis in international law that . . . it 
needs the most searching scrutiny.”242
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 A less policy-based and more international law-based justiªcation 
for the Iraq War was U.N. Resolution 1441, which stated that Iraq was 
in breach of Resolution 687.243 Critics have argued that basing 
justiªcation on a “revival” of the authorization of a coalition to use 
force against Iraq that existed from the Persian Gulf War is ºawed in 
many ways.244 Most signiªcantly, there is no doctrine of revival in Se-
curity Council proceedings, any “revival” would have to be in coalition 
with Kuwait, and “Resolution 1441, on its face, quite patently does not 
authorise the use of force against Iraq and does not indicate that the 
authorization to the 1991 States acting in coalition with Kuwait could 
possibly be revived.”245 Despite political, humanitarian, and national 
security arguments supporting the Iraq War, it is clear that a 
justiªcation for war grounded in international law is tenuous. 
B. Scope of Coalition Responsibility Under a Modiªed United Nations 
Compensation Commission Scheme 
 If the Security Council were to determine that the Iraq War was an 
illegal use of force, then Coalition nations could be held liable for 
broad categories of damages under the UNCC precedent.246 As dis-
cussed above, U.N. Resolution 687 established Iraq’s liability for dam-
age—speciªcally environmental damage—incurred during the Persian 
Gulf War.247 However, Iraq is liable for damage beyond the actions of its 
own military.248 Iraq is also liable for damages resulting from the ac-
tions of both sides of the conºict; though this provision has drawn criti-
cism, it is grounded in a norm of international law that holds aggres-
sors responsible for “damage arising from the legitimate exercise of a 
self-defence by the state that is the victim of the aggression.”249 In addi-
tion, Iraq is liable to the UNCC for damage resulting “from the break-
down of civil order in Kuwait and Iraq.”250
 Given that Iraqi forces fought to repel Coalition troops, and that 
civil unrest has resulted in two years of violence by insurgents, the 
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Coalition could be held civilly liable for environmental damages be-
yond those caused directly by its own military.251
C. Should the U.S.-Led Coalition Be Held Civilly Liable? 
 The documented and potential damage to Iraq’s environment as a 
result of the Iraq War is widespread and hard to dispute.252 The Iraq 
War has been very expensive for the United States, and it is unclear 
how much of the reconstruction costs the United States will pay.253 
Senator Joseph Biden has stated that the United States “typically covers 
about 25% of the post-conºict reconstructions costs,” but that strained 
relations with foreign nations as a result of the conºict will probably 
lead to reduced international contributions.254 In addition, Iraq, at the 
end of 2004, had amassed $200 billion in debt and reparations.255
 Given the grim ªnancial situation in Iraq and the low priority of-
ten given to environmental damage—as evidenced by the category 
system of the UNCC—it is likely that there will not be adequate fund-
ing for environmental rehabilitation in postwar Iraq.256 Holding Coa-
lition nations civilly liable through an adapted UNCC will force the 
wealthier nations who engaged in military activity—without the im-
primatur of the Security Council or international law—that resulted 
in environmental degradation throughout Iraq to repay Iraqi citizens 
for that damage. 
 In addition to fairness, imposing civil liability on Coalition nations 
for environmental damage caused during the Iraq War will also per-
form the important normative function of assessing state responsibility 
for causing environmental damage, as was the case with Iraq in Resolu-
tion 687.257 Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, U.S. forces 
established an informal system of compensation for aggrieved Iraqis.258 
The program, dubbed “condolence payments,” allows Iraqis to ªle 
claims for death, injury, and property damage and to receive compen-
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sation from the U.S. military.259 The compensation system, however, 
“does not admit guilt or acknowledge liability or negligence. . . . [But, is 
rather] a gesture that expresses sympathy in concrete terms.”260 This 
type of system is indicative of nations’ reluctance to voluntarily take re-
sponsibility for wartime damages.261 However, assessing UNCC civil li-
ability to Coalition forces, as was done to Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, 
would express state responsibility in concrete terms.262 This application 
of UNCC liability to Coalition forces would act as a deterrent to future 
conºicts, since the cost of engaging in armed conºict would greatly 
increase.263 This precedent would be invaluable in ensuring that ag-
gressive nations include harm to the environment in their calculations 
when contemplating possible military action.264
 Over the ªrst year of the program, the United States has paid out 
about $2.2 million in the form of condolence payments.265 This paltry 
sum makes it apparent that UNCC involvement is required to ensure 
that Iraqis are sufªciently compensated for their environmental 
losses.266 The closest that condolence payments come to recognizing 
environmental damage is a maximum ªve hundred dollar payment 
for property damage.267 Attaining condolence payments is difªcult for 
Iraqis as they shoulder the burden of proof and U.S. military com-
manders make the decisions without any appeals process.268 Major 
John Moore, an Army legal ofªcer, described the condolence pay-
ments “‘as a public relations tool—sort of a no-hard-feelings type of 
payment’ . . . . ‘It’s not designed to make them whole again, only to 
alleviate their hardships.’”269 As the full extent of the damage to Iraq’s 
environment becomes apparent, there are certain to be justiªed 
“hard feelings” on the part of Iraqi citizens. Regardless of the sympa-
thetic nature of the condolence payment program, Iraqi citizens—like 
the citizens of Kuwait following the Persian Gulf War—deserve a pro-
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gram that will aim to make their degraded environment whole again 
through adequate payments and an accessible, fair claims process. 
The UNCC is such a mechanism, and the U.N. should build upon the 
Persian Gulf War precedent by imposing civil liability for environ-
mental damage on Coalition forces through this mechanism. 
Conclusion 
 Military history, as well as more current events such as the Persian 
Gulf War and the Iraq War, makes clear that war causes signiªcant envi-
ronmental damage. This is a fact that is often overlooked when consid-
ering the toll of war. Current international environmental law provi-
sions are inadequate to protect the natural environmental from 
wartime degradation. If effective wartime environmental protection 
does not yet exist, a civil liability system can act as a substitute, serving 
as both a deterrent to aggressive nations and as an opportunity for en-
vironmental remediation. 
 Following the Persian Gulf War, the U.N. made a signiªcant step 
toward such a civil liability system by establishing the UNCC, with ju-
risdiction to approve claims for environmental damage. However, as it 
stands now, the UNCC is not fully equipped to effectively assess civil 
liability for wartime environmental degradation. The UNCC must be 
adapted to better compensate for environmental harms. 
 With an adapted UNCC in place, the U.N. should continue its 
forward progress in the area of compensation for wartime environ-
mental damage by imposing UNCC civil liability against Coalition 
forces for environmental degradation during the Iraq War. The liability 
will ensure that Iraq’s environment is restored to prewar conditions, 
but also will extend the valuable UNCC precedent, which will act as a 
deterrent to future conºicts. 
 Despite the strong fairness, deterrence, and environmental reme-
diation arguments for imposing UNCC liability on Coalition forces, it is 
unlikely to occur for political reasons. Given the power that the United 
States and Great Britain wield in the international community, it is un-
likely that the U.N. will risk further fraying an already tense relation-
ship by passing a resolution placing formal blame on Coalition nations. 
